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ments was a slight mistake, 'lead us under temptation.' About five hours later after four readings the whole prayer was reproduced accurately and without hesitation.

In number of words this prayer is three times as long and in number of ideas twice as complicated as the four lines of 'The Village Blacksmith,' but the subconscious remnants of the prayer, coupled perhaps with a greater interest, served to make the patient master of this composition after twenty-five readings.

The results of all the experiments indicate the relative ease of reeducation in conditions of aphasia, and it appears advisable to attempt such reeducation whenever the physical condition of the patient permits. There is danger of too great mental as well as physical work in some aphasic cases and a too rigid course of training should not be attempted. Aphasias due to emboli could, of course, be more actively treated than the cases due to cerebral hemorrhage. In all cases in which there is a possibility of training, a few minutes each day, morning and afternoon, would soon produce noticeable betterment. The experiments which have been carried on with this patient seem to indicate that new brain paths are opened in the reeducation process, and in this work it is probable that the right side of the cerebrum takes part. More experiments are needed (and on more cases) along the lines of the formation of definite speech associations before the latter conclusion can be conclusively drawn.

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DISCUSSION

IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM

PROFESSOR BAKEWELL writes as follows, in an open letter to me in this JOURNAL concerning 'Immediate Empiricism':¹ "My difficulty, in short, is simply this: Either everything experienced is real exactly as, and no further than, it is then and there experienced—and then there is no occasion to speak of correcting or rectifying experience; or, there is in every experience a self-transcendence which points beyond that thing *as experienced* for *its own* reality—and then good-bye to immediatism." And in a foot-note he says that my view is atomistic, chopping reals off from one another, and that if 'this consequence is avoided by making the earlier experience con-

¹ Vol. II., No. 19, p. 521. See also this JOURNAL, Vol. II., No. 15, p. 393.

tain implicitly the later to which it leads, immediatism gives way to a doctrine of mediation.'

There was once a botanist who suggested that instead of deducing botany from the concept of plants (and from certain allied concepts) the proper method was to study plants to see what each was in itself. Whereupon an opponent replied that such a doctrine destroyed botany. "Take the case of a seed"; he urged, "either you mean that this seed just as it now is, and no further, is real, and then growth is impossible; or else there is in the seed a self-transforming somewhat which changes it first into a sprouting plant, and then, finally, into a mature plant with seed of its own—and then good-by to the idea that the reality of the seed is to be sought in just what the seed now, and no further, is. Moreover," he continued, "since each plant in itself is something different from every other, the doctrine makes relation of plants to one another, and hence generalization, and hence science, impossible."

Whereupon the first-mentioned botanist replied that either a given seed is alive and capable of growth, or, dead and incapable of becoming a plant, and that the actual state of affairs in this respect is precisely one of the things to be determined by a study of the particular seed; that it is of the very essence of the method that the question of 'further' or 'no further' should be settled by reference not to general notions, but by reference to the *determinate* character of the particular seed. Moreover, it was just by a study of each plant 'in itself' that one would find out whether it was something unrelated, atomistic, or something genetically and responsibly connected with other plants, relationship being precisely an affair of the determinate character of the seed.

In other words, while I expressly state in my article (1) that a thing which is rectified in a subsequent cognitive experience 'contains within itself' (that is as part of its own concrete determinate thinghood) 'the elements of the transformation of its own content,' and (2) expressly disclaim the possibility of deriving any conclusions whatever from the concept of immediate experience, Professor Bakewell expressly assumes (1) that the very *concept* of immediate experience carries with it some necessary implication regarding the character or nature of *what* is experienced, and (2) that it precludes any continuity of experienced things. As an immediate empiricist, I can only reply that it is to things *as* experienced that I go for instruction as to continuity, transformation and mediation; and that it is just because I find things immediately experienced *as* continuous, and *as* self-rectifying that I believe in continuity and self-rectification. Compare the distinction of cognitive and cognized

in the former article, and the reference to the importance of the 'drift, occasion and contexture' of things—distinctions which are inherent and not external to the things. Does the transcendentalist believe that things *as* experienced are continuous? If yes, why should he charge an empiricist with *ex officio* denial of this empirical fact? But if he holds that a transcendental principle or function is required to give continuity to what as experienced is 'chopped-off,' then *he* would seem to be the one denying actual, empirical, continuity. I am always wishing that some transcendentalist would expound and expose his own positive doctrine about the problems which he accuses the empiricist of maltreating, instead of assuming that the transcendental position is self-evident, or at least thoroughly understood. Perhaps Professor Bakewell will help in this illumination, bearing in mind that an important motive in developing the newer philosophy has been the conviction that mediation, continuity, reconstruction and growth are facts which transcendentalism has failed consistently to define and account for. I do not understand the notion that because things of immediate experience are real, mediation can not be real. I am quite sure that the logic of immediate empiricism would include mediation along with the categories 'subjective, objective, physical, mental, psychic, etc.' (see Vol. II., p. 399) and say, 'if you wish to find out what it means, go to experience and see what it is experienced *as*.' I find difficulty in realizing the difficulty which one has with immediately experiencing something *as* mediate. I don't see *any* way of experiencing the mediate (any more than of experiencing a cat or a dog) excepting that of immediately experiencing it *as* what it is, viz., mediate. If I were to make a guess as to the origin of the difficulty, I should refer it to a mental habit of employing a conceptual, instead of an empirical, philosophy,² a habit so inveterate as to display itself even when one is attempting to appreciate the position of an empiricist.

I conclude with a question and a remark: Does Professor Bakewell mean to deny (1) that all philosophic conceptions must somehow enter into experience, or (2) that all experience is, *as existence*, immediate? The remark is, that I quite meant my earlier statement, (Vol. II., p. 399), that from the postulate I gave, not a single philosophical proposition could be deduced—that its significance was that of affording a method of philosophical analysis.

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² Lest I be charged with intimating that concepts are unreal and unempirical, I say forthwith that I believe meanings may be and are immediately experienced *as* conceptual.